Iraq a Model? Be Careful of What You Wish For

Even when it had 140,000 troops in the country, the U.S. had precious little influence over the choices made by Iraq’s government — from the moment the Bush Administration was forced in 2004, by Iraqi popular pressure, to concede that Iraqis would choose their own government (rather than be ruled by Iraqis chosen by the U.S. for an extended period), the country’s political fate has effectively been out of Washington’s hands.
The Republican critics who insist that President Barack Obama threw Iraq to the wolves forget the inconvenient fact that Iraq’s democratically elected government refused to give them a legal basis to remain in the country. Still, having invested so much American blood and treasure in Iraq, the U.S. public may be inclined to see Washington as bearing some responsibility for the outcome there. (And, perhaps more importantly, Washington’s traditional allies in the region see the U.S. as responsible for the outcome of an invasion they counseled against.) So, while he might have opposed the war to begin with, events in Iraq in the New Year could nonetheless land at Obama’s door. And the President’s valedictory address on the war that spoke of a “successful, democratic Iraq becoming a model for the entire region” is sounding distinctly Pollyannaish: Iraq is showing signs of turning into an increasingly bloody mess in the New Year.
The wave of terror attacks against mostly Shi’ite civilians that killed 73 people last week and continued this week are a graphic illustration of the consequences of the sectarian schism that has widened in recent weeks in Iraqi politics. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki appears to be hardening that divide by systematically targeting leading Sunni political rivals to his Shi’ite dominated government, who are backing Kurdish-style autonomy for three predominantly Sunni provinces northwest of Baghdad, and who are warning that Maliki’s attacks risk rekindling the Sunni insurgency that bedeviled the U.S. occupation.
Al-Qaeda was marginalized in Iraq when most of that insurgency aligned with the U.S. in the “Awakening” movement, but those Sunnis who fought alongside the Americans (and on their payroll) against the jihadists were never reconciled with the Shi’ite dominated Maliki government. The alienation of the Sunnis from the new political order therefore creates a more permissive environment for al-Qaeda types to operate, and the collapse of the political contract in Baghdad that ties the major ethnic and sectarian factions to the political process therefore threatens major instability in the coming year.
Maliki, both by measures of votes in parliament and control of men under arms, is stronger than any other faction leader in Iraq right now, but he’s not strong enough to rule Iraq on his own. Indeed, he has the job of prime minister only because Iran — mindful of the importance of keeping a friendly government in Baghdad — intervened to convince rival Shi’ite leaders, most important among them being Moqtada al-Sadr, to back another Maliki term.
But other neighbors, particularly those at odds with Iran such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, have other ideas. Both backed the Sunni-dominated Iraqiya bloc that challenged Maliki, and Saudi Arabia has been engaged in proxy conflicts with Iran across the region. A breakdown in Iraq’s governance and a renewal of sectarian violence — exacerbated by the increasingly sectarian civil war in neighboring Syria — could draw in all of Iraq’s neighbors and presage its breakup.
Avoiding a politically damaging catastrophe in Iraq may well depend on the willingness of some of its neighbors, particularly Iran, to impose some discipline on the sectarian impulses of their allies in Baghdad. As with much else in the Middle East these days, that’s a eventuality that’s largely out of U.S. hands.
Iran: Stumbling Into War in an Election Year?

The Obama Administration clearly doesn’t want to go to war with Iran and risk a disastrous conflagration in the Middle East with potentially devastating consequence for the world economy. But it also is unwilling or unable to engage in serious diplomacy with Tehran — or perhaps it simply recognizes the limited prospects for progress in such a venture given the political dynamics on both sides of the equation. Whatever the reason, the Administration is caught between two stools: It is under domestic political pressure to escalate the confrontation, with Republicans courting the pro-Israel vote by declaring their resolve to get tougher with Iran and branding Obama as feckless. Yet, the Pentagon — and also some high profile Israeli securocrats, such as former Mossad chief Meir Dagan — have made clear that the “military option” the Administration insists is still “on the table” would likely spark a disastrous regional war, and would at best delay Iraq’s progress by a year or two. (Western intelligence agencies currently concur that Iran’s leaders have not yet taken a decision to actually build nuclear weapons, even though they’re steadily accumulating the means to implement such a decision should it be made — both Dagan and former Defense Secretary Robert Gates have warned that military strikes could prompt Iran to choose to build a nuclear deterrent.)
But hawkish voices, including the Israeli government, insist that a moment of crisis is approaching and the window of opportunity to stop Iran developing nuclear weapons capacity is closing.
The Administration insists that the sanctions it has painstakingly put in place at the U.N. and unilaterally among Western powers will provide the effective pressure necessary to persuade Iran to back down. Obama’s U.N. Ambassador, Susan Rice, said recently that sanctions were not an end in themselves but a means to buy time for a “diplomatic solution.” But if by diplomatic solution the Administration means Iran agreeing to Western demands, that may be wishful thinking. On the other hand, a diplomatic compromise that leaves the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons materiel in Iran’s hands will be a tough sell domestically — as well as with allies such as Israel and France. And that’s assuming such a compromise were currently feasible from the Iranian side, where election-year domestic politics also militate against concessions to the West.
The problem facing the Administration is that sanctions may not prove to be an alternative to war — or compromise — and its room to maneuver in an election year will be limited, even as the lack of diplomatic communication between the two sides, as the Pentagon has warned, raises the danger of misunderstandings that could lead to confrontation. The direction of the U.S.-Iran standoff in 2012 may, however, be determined by others: The Israelis insist that they may yet decide to take matters into their own hands by launching military strikes (technical limitations on Israel’s capacity to do the job notwithstanding); China, Russia, Turkey and others are resisting new sanctions and maintaining economic ties with Iran, placing themselves between Tehran and the Western powers and demanding dialogue. Iran’s key Arab rival, Saudi Arabia, is at once confronting Tehran’s allies across the region and also offering dialogue on the nuclear issue. With Obama Administration policy unlikely to provide a game changer in the coming year, the question is, will others force the issue?
Why the World Promises Obama a Bumpy Ride in 2012
- Iraq a Model? Be Careful of What You Wish For
- Iran: Stumbling Into War in an Election Year?
- Will China Help Rein in North Korea?
- Libya: Be Careful of What You Wish For II
- Egypt: The Junta or the Islamists?
- Eurozone: Dragging Everyone Down?
- Losing Pakistan, Losing Afghanistan?
- Syria: Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don’t
- Israel and Palestinians: Life Without a ‘Peace Process’
- Al-Qaeda’s Growing African Foothold













